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Abstract: Based on an authentic case of contracting for environmental property rights, our paper 
shows several implications of applying the Coase’s propositions. The case study adds empirical 
content to basic transaction costs concepts by analyzing the design and implementation of a 
contractual arrangement between a pollutee –a bottler of mineral water Vittel– and several polluting 
farmers. We analyze the bargaining between land and water rights owners and the bottler Vittel to 
determine how transaction cost issues (valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly conditions, and third-
party effects) were overcome and how they succeeded in contracting for environmental property 
rights. We provide several comparisons of the Vittel case with other similar cases, leading to 
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Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel 
 
‘Such studies would enable us to discover which 
factors are important and which are not in 
determining the outcome, and they would lead to 
generalizations which have a solid base. They are 
also likely to serve another purpose by showing us 
the  richness of the social alternatives among 
which we can choose.’ (Coase, 1974, p. 375) 
 
‘By analyzing the details of property rights 
negotiations, including the positions taken by the 
various parties, their characteristics, and the 
information available, one can determine why 
property rights emerge in the manner that they 




Established in 130 countries, Nestlé Waters
2 is the world leader in bottled water
3. The bottler includes 
several famous brands such as Vittel and Perrier using one or a small number of very specific and 
geographically delineated springs. In the early 1970’s, intensification of farming practices in the Vittel 
area, located in the French Vosges mountains, led to concerns about imbalances in the local 
ecosystem. More precisely, in 1988, the production unit of the bottler of mineral water Vittel
4 noticed 
a quality deterioration  in its mineral water, notably a slow but regular and significant increase in 
nitrates. The main cause was non-point source pollution from intensive farming practiced in the fields 
surrounding the Vittel springs, the so-called ‘small Parisian basin’ by analogy with the ‘Parisian basin’ 
well-known for its intensive agricultural practices.  These upstream farmers (about 4 0 farmers for 
3 500 ha) are mainly milk and cereals producers. In 1989, the whole turnover of agricultural activities 
in the catchment area was less than 2% of the turnover of Vittel, which is also a major employer in the 
area (1300 salaries) (INRA, 1997, p. 11). The dairy production is based on corn, which is considered 
as an important factor of nitrates increase (Deffontaines and Brossier; Perrot-Maître and Davis, 2001). 
The percolation of nitrogen runoff and intensive pesticides use affect the quality of the bottled water. 
Table 1 provides some technical data about this environmental problem. 
 
Table 1. Some technical data about the environmental problem. 
Catchment area  3500 ha 
Number of concerned farmers in 1989-1990  37 farmers with a mean age of 40 years 
Legal status of farms  70 % are individual familial farms 
 
Vittel attempted several unsuccessful strategies to deal with this problem such as the use of regulatory 
pressures, meetings with officials of the Ministry of the Environment concerning significant changes 
in farming practices, collaboration with the Chamber of Agriculture
5, purchase of fields and so forth. 
Therefore, Vittel turned its attention to research by contracting with the French National Agronomic 
                                                 
2 Nestlé Waters was previously known as Perrier-Vittel, which was itself known before as the Société générale des eaux 
minérales de Vittel. 
 
3 Vittel is one of the world's top ten best-selling brands and contributes highly to the reputation and financial results of 
Nestlé Waters. Key data of Nestlé Waters in 2004 includes: Sales: € 5.2 billion; Estimated market share in value: 17%; 
Number of brands: 77 (Source: Nestlé Waters: http://www.nestle-waters.com/en/). 
 
4 Hereafter, Vittel designates the Vittel Company, regardless of its formal name. 
 
5  Established in 1924, the Chamber o f Agriculture is a professional public  institution representing farmers and  rural 
interests. 
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Institute (INRA) for a specific research-action program, the so-called AGREV program
6. Researchers 
from INRA were familiar with the local agriculture because of previous collaboration with farmers on 
agricultural  extension issues (INRA). The question of Vittel was expressed as follows:  "What 
changes are required concerning farming activity, used on the site, and under what conditions in 
order to reduce the rate of nitrates found beneath the roots of cultivated plants and grassland, and to 
ensure that this rate remains below the limit of 10 mg per liter?"
7 (Deffontaines and Brossier, 2000). 
This question initiated a negotiated management program that led to a formal contractual arrangement 
between Vittel and farmers, in the way suggested by the Coase’s seminal contribution (1960).  
 
At first glance, the problem between Vittel and farmers was potentially very complex and likely to 
generate high transaction costs that could derail a Coasean solution. Nevertheless, these presumably 
high transaction costs were overcome and Vittel successfully contracted for environmental property 
rights
8 with farmers. Our primary objective is to show how these two parties with conflictual interests 
and other stakeholders succeeded in contracting for environmental property rights. We show that a 
bargaining solution succeeded  notably  because (1) Vittel acted in innovative ways to reduce the 
transaction costs of bargaining, and (2) because the transaction costs were in fact sufficiently low 
compared to the overall gain resulting from the rearrangement. The case study adds empirical content 
to basic transaction costs concepts by analyzing the design and implementation of a contractual 
arrangement. We make use of detailed records –reports by INRA, academic papers, popular and 
technical press. These documents describe the bargaining history between Vittel and farmers as they 
negotiated over land use and property rights. Additionally, we did several interviews with key 
persons, i.e. some researchers (Marc Barbier, Eduardo Chia, Pierre Morlon and Philippe Pierre)
9 from 
INRA who were  actively involved in the process. These interviews make clear the bargaining 
positions, strategies and key issues of contention. 
 
The originality of this paper is fourfold. (1) It considers the case of a non-point source pollution, i.e. 
intensive family farming practices in a well delimited area affecting the water quality of an industrial 
bottler. (2) It studies the whole process from the identification of the problem to the selection, design, 
implementation and running of a specific  and partially self-enforcing  solution,  stressing the 
difficulties and costs encountered at each step. The contractual arrangement deals with environmental 
property rights but also attempts to ‘lock’ polluters into environmentally friendly practices. (3) It 
analyzes the precise nature of the compensation paid by the pollutee to polluters and subsequent 
implications. Indeed, the monetary transfers are found to mainly cover the short-term loss changes for 
which the contract is established. (4) The case of Vittel provides raw materials for confronting 
theoretical propositions and arguments with a real world situation.  It  makes also  comparative 
evidence with other similar cases where there are potential contracting problems i.e. the Katell-Roc 
water bottler in Brittany experiencing water pollution and the Auxerre or Munich program to preserve 
its water quality. This comparison puts into relief which key transaction costs were sufficiently low to 
allow for successful contracting. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Based on Coase’s recommendations on the need 
to examine in detail the social alternatives to deal with an environmental externality, the next section 
answers the following question: why Vittel contracted with farmers?  Section  3  analyzes the 
transaction cost issues, i.e. valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly and third party effects, that shaped 
                                                 
6 AGREV is the French acronym for ‘Agriculture Environnement Vittel’. 
 
7 While European regulation limits the maximum level of nitrates to 15 mg/l for mineral water for infant feeding, some 
countries impose a tough threshold nitrates level of 10 mg/l (INRA, 1997). 
 
8 Property rights are social institutions that define or delimit the range of privileges that are granted to individuals or entities 
regarding specific assets. Such assets have multiple attributes and not all attributes are necessarily owned by the same person. 
The rights to attributes can be partitioned and reallocated on a temporary or permanent basis thanks to contracts (Libecap). 
 
9 The views expressed do not implicate the interviewed individuals. Any error or misinterpretation is the sole responsibility 
of the authors.   5 
the outcome. Section  4 shows how these transaction costs were overcome leading to the success of 
the Vittel bargaining. Section 5 exposes the Vittel bargaining and highlights the relevant features of 
this contractual arrangement.  Section  6  provides an assessment of the arrangement.  Section  7 
considers the implications/generalizations for transaction cost economics that can be drawn from the 
case study. Section 8 concludes and highlights several exciting challenges for future research. 
 
 
2. Why Vittel contracted with farmers? 
According to the line of reasoning of Coase, we first identify the ‘richness of the social alternatives’ 
between which Vittel can a priori choose. Several factors stressed by Libecap (1989) – the great size 
of the anticipated aggregate benefits, the small number of implied farmers, their relative homogeneity 
and the relative balanced repartition of wealth under the considered property rights allocation – show 
that an institutional re-arrangement was very likely to occur. At first glance, five alternatives were at 
least considered by Vittel: 
 
  - (1) Vittel relocates its activity by choosing new and non-contaminated springs, 
  - (2) Vittel buys all the lands around the site (a kind of ‘quasi-integration’), 
  - (3) Vittel does nothing,  
  - (4) Vittel constrains farmers to change their practices by taking legal action,  
  - (5) Vittel achieves a contractual arrangement with farmers. 
 
A closer analysis of the  situation shows that the first four alternatives were prohibitively costly, 
making Vittel ‘prisoner’ to the last solution. (1) Relocation would cause Vittel  to lose the worthy 
reputation asset tied with the location at Vittel and the right to label its water as a ‘natural mineral 
water’
10 (Barbier, 2004). Note that in France mineral natural water must come from the same springs, 
while natural spring water can come from different springs, regardless of their respective locations.  
 
(2) Because of the reluctance of several farmers and regulatory barriers aiming at preserving lands for 
agricultural activities, Vittel could not buy all the lands around its springs. One of the goals of these 
laws is to prevent the purchase of agricultural lands for non-agricultural uses. Moreover, even if it 
was possible to buy all the lands, Vittel does not have competences to manage the whole area and was 
not interested in making that. Nevertheless, such integration would have allowed Vittel to acquire at 
the same time the environmental property rights bundled with the land use. As developed below 
(section 4), the Vittel attempt to buy surrounded fields succeeded to some extent.  
 
(3) The third alternative was also not suitable because the potential loss from doing nothing could be 
huge. Indeed, the market of bottled water is very sensitive to water quality. Indeed, in France and 
other European countries, one of the most powerful arguments of natural mineral water is their 
preservation from any pollution. Moreover, the main element, the nitrates rate is frequently discussed 
in popular press to denounce the quality of drinking water and constitutes in some cases, the most 
significant motive to switch to bottled water. Any presumption or doubt about the bottled water 
quality can make consumers switching to a rival product. Note that some rival brands e.g. Wattwiller, 
or Vernet label their bottled waters as ‘nitrates free’ or ‘zero nitrates’
11. 
 
Let us assume that Vittel does nothing in order to prevent farming pollution. Consequently the nitrate 
rate increases continuously. Moreover, Vittel markets its water as high quality mineral water, 
beneficial for drinker health. Doing nothing and letting an increase in the nitrate rate will only be 
sanctioned within the terms of a certain probability. Thus, the opportunity cost of Vittel by doing 
nothing may be considered as the statistical expectation of a sanction  s = pL, where  p is the 
                                                 
10 In France, Vittel water is 50 % more expensive than the Aquarel water (i.e. the generic spring water of Nestlé that comes 
from different springs). 
 
11 LSA, 1998, De grands troubles dans l'eau, n° 1566, 59-69. 
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probability of being exposed and  L the severity of the punishment. Because of the mandatory 
requirement to label the water composition including the nitrate rate per liter and the rivals’ strategy 
publicizing their ‘low nitrate rate’ or ‘nitrate free’
12, it is realistic to consider that p is close or equals 
to 1. The biggest difficulty is the estimation of the losses that Vittel may encounter if he does nothing. 
To provide a realistic approximation, we gathered anecdotal evidence on the ‘Perrier affair’. The 
denunciation of an abnormal contamination of the Perrier mineral water by benzene led to the recall 
of several hundreds millions of bottles in all countries, a decrease of the firm value in the stock 
market and a costly advertising campaign. Eighteen months after the crisis, Perrier’s share of the 
sparkling water market declined from 13 percent to 9 percent in the US and from 49 percent to less 
than 30 percent in the UK. The total cost of the global recall from 120 countries incurred by Perrier 
due to this one-shot problem has been estimated to  $ 263 millions
13 (about  € 217  millions). 
Noteworthy several industrial bottlers such as Katell-Roc or Divona, have been forced to close or 
abandon springs because of farming pollution, especially in Brittany well-known for its high nitrate 
rate in groundwater.  Unlike the Perrier case, the Vittel problem was recurrent but likely to be 
perceived as potentially harmful for health, especially for babies
14. Anecdotal evidence supports that 
the opportunity cost by doing nothing was considerable. 
 
(4) The fourth alternative was explored, but the liability of farmers was somewhat unfunded and thus 
the problem cannot be solved by enforcement of existing laws and regulations, such as the Water Act 
of 1964 (INRA). But, even if it was, it could not be imposed and enforced without publicizing the 
Vittel problem. Such publicity was likely to generate negative spillovers on the image of Vittel with 
huge consequence on sales (Barbier, 2004; INRA). Vittel attempted in 1988 to impose ‘ready to use’ 
solutions, elaborated by the French Committee for the Reduction of Water Pollution by Nitrates 
(CORPEN). This solution was to transform all the fields of the catchment area in grasslands. The 
success of such a strategy was limited because it cannot be legally imposed to farmers who perceived 
it as not adapted to their production system. 
 
(5) Therefore, only the fifth solution remained, which was considered as the solution with the lowest 
overall costs. According to Perrot-Maître and Davis, Vittel ‘has come to realize that protection of 
water sources is more cost effective than building filtration plants or moving continuously to new 
sources.’ This solution was feasible because the involved parties were well-identified, not too 
numerous and the definition of accurate property rights possible at a reasonable cost. Indeed property 
rights shaping the water quality like any other resource are subject to optimization, that is to say, they 
are defined to the extent that the benefits of definition exceed the costs of definition (Barzel, 1997). 
 
Proposition 1: Under some circumstances, transacting parties may be somewhat ‘prisoner’ to a 
given social solution. This lock-in that can be caused by the institutional framework (North, 1990) 
can derail transaction cost economics predictions (Williamson, 1991) and lead to adjusting the 
transaction’s dimensions to fit the available governance structure. 
 
Indeed, transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991) predicts that transactions, which differ in their 
attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to 
effect a discriminating  – mainly transaction costs-economizing  – result. In the Vittel case, the 
suggested mechanism was to some extent reversed. This issue is analyzed more thoroughly in the 
following sections.  
 
                                                 
12 See Ippolito and Matthios, 1990 for a theoretical justification of this rationale known under the name of unfolding theory. 
 
13 At this time, the company did not have product recall and guarantee insurance. 
 
14 High nitrate levels in water can cause methemoglobinemia or ‘blue baby syndrome’. For instance, the Katell-roc bottler 
shut down its production unit in Brittany because of water pollution by nitrates, which was publicly known due to sickness of 
a child in the region close to the source (See section 4 and Table 5 for a larger description of this case).   7 
 
3. Institutional arrangements and Transaction costs issues:  Valuation Disputes, Bi-
lateral Monopoly, and Third-Party Effects 
Let us now consider precisely what transaction costs are implied by this contractual arrangement and 
their determinants. According to Coase ‘in order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to 
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what 
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the 
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on’. 
Operational definitions of transaction costs usually refer to the successive phases of an exchange 
transaction (Dahlman 1979; Barzel, 1985; Williamson 1975; Furubotn and Ritcher, 2000). The notion 
of transaction costs used here includes the costs of discovering, negotiating, and completing the 
exchange of an asset, in this case, environmental rights tied to lands. Broadly speaking, exchange 
requires identifying the relevant parties; communicating information about the asset to be traded and 
terms of trade (offer and ask prices); inspection, verification, and measurement of the asset; 
negotiation to reach a sale price over mutually-accepted asset attributes and property rights; and 
finally, contract drafting and enforcement. The transaction costs literature emphasizes that each of 
these activities can be complex, affecting the timing, extent, and nature of trade (Libecap, 2004).  
 
The data related to the Vittel case underscores the potential complexity involved in transactions, 
especially with respect to search, measurement, and negotiation. Two key points are useful for 
understanding subsequent bargaining disputes. (1) One is related to the precise definition of the asset 
upon which to contract. The water quality problem encountered by Vittel resulted from agricultural 
practices in a given area. The right to choose among a set of practices, that can be described as a 
continuum from harmless practices to very polluting ones (from the Vittel viewpoint) is bundled with 
the lands. This right is consequently owned by the land user, i.e. the farmer. Once the adequate area 
(including some farmers and excluding others) and practices are defined, the losses generated by the 
proposed changes have to be evaluated. (2) Farms were somewhat heterogeneous with respect to their 
surface share located in the catchment area, production process, economic performances and farmers’ 
projects
15. Consequently the valuation of practices changes was a particularly contentious issue for 
farms. The higher the surface in the catchment area, the farer the farmer project and production 
process from the changes desired by Vittel and the better the economic performances were, the more 
contentious the negotiation issues were.  
 
In bargaining between farmers and Vittel between 1989 and 1999 there were three general classes of 
overlapping problems that impeded agreement: valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly conflicts, and 
third-party effects. 
 
31. Valuation Disputes 
There were two conflicts in determining compensations for the changes required by Vittel. One was 
the basis for general valuation of required changes -whether these changes should be valued as the 
sum of a loss in terms of reduced agricultural output, project re-orientation, transition effects and 
investments to apply new practices or as an input to the value increase of Vittel water, i.e. the 
opportunity cost of farmers versus the opportunity cost of Vittel if it does nothing. This was 
principally a negotiation issue. The second was the determination of the value of any particular 
changes when farms were somewhat heterogeneous. This was both a measurement and a negotiation 
issue.  
 
In terms of the first problem, Vittel wanted to use the loss and investments subsequent to the required 
changes, i.e. adjustment costs in determining the compensations it offered farmers, whereas farmers 
wanted to use the opportunity cost of Vittel in order to get much more. If compensations were to be 
                                                 
15 Farm project can be positioned on a continuum from a project corresponding to the Vittel specifications to a very intensive 
and potentially polluting project. Farmers’ projects were characterized and classified by sociologists and economists from the 
research team.   8 
determined relative to Vittel gains, measurement costs (tied to performance) would be very high and 
uncertainty would add complexity to the problem. Rather, compensating farmers based (directly) on 
their revenues was a more visible and then credible strategy. Noteworthy, there can be economies of 
scale and learning by doing over time in a more precise delineation of property rights, leading certain 
parties that are likely to repeat similar transactions to incur a priori high initial transaction costs, e.g. 
Nestlé Waters in other locations.  In terms of the second problem, the valuation of changes in a 
particular farm was a continuing and important source of contention because the value agreed 
determined the owners ‘share’ of the aggregate rents from the rights rearrangement. Several farmers 
typically held out for higher compensations or to get reliable data on the sustainability of Vittel 
propositions.  In negotiations, each farm owner had the most complete information about the 
agricultural potential of his farm, personal project and the impacts of changes, but at the same time, 
had incentive to exaggerate their values.  
 
Farmers challenged the estimated values of their characteristics. Challenges were based on disputes 
both regarding the relevant comparison basis, as well as assessment of individual farm characteristics. 
The disparities between the bid and ask prices due to measurement disputes could sometimes be very 
large. Agreement on changes valuation was also complicated by a lack of trust on both sides. Vittel 
viewed some farmers as making exorbitant compensation demands. Farmers, by contrast, viewed 
Vittel as attempting to undervalue the changes while the benefits for Vittel were huge in comparison. 
This limited trust meant that neither party held the other’s pricing claims as credible or honest.  This 
condition increased the transaction costs of negotiation and lengthened the time necessary for 
agreement. 
 
32. Bi-lateral Monopoly Disputes 
Disputes over valuation of critical changes took place within a bi-lateral monopoly context, and this 
condition increased the costs of negotiation apart from measurement issues. Vittel was the only 
‘purchaser’ of environmental rights tied to land use in the Vittel area. The reputation asset and the 
plant located at Vittel were a large fixed,  hardly redeployable investment. Their values and future 
profit flows depended upon the changes in farms. While Vittel could negotiate with each farmer in the 
targeted area, it could not walk away from the Vittel area as a whole.  Each farmer located in the 
strategic area has also a kind of monopoly power to contract with Vittel, because lands they hold are 
not substitutable with other similar lands. In addition, the exploitations are not concerned the same 
way because the surface share per farm in the catchment area varies from 1 to 62% (INRA, 1996). 
Notice that at least two reasons can explain how the strategic location of farmland near the spring can 
lead to opportunistic behavior. First, if a close-to-the-spring farmer can, on his own, contaminate the 
groundwater to above 15 mg, then the farmer can obviously hold up the entire contracting process. 
Second, if the value of securing contracts with farmers within but near the perimeter of the sensitive 
area is conditional on also securing contracts with close-to-the-spring farmers, then hold-up rents are 
created for the close-to-the-spring farmers and they have incentives to act opportunistically. Because 
of the geographical configuration
16, each farmer in the catchment area, regardless of his closeness to 
the spring can individually shape to some extent the nitrate rates. This partial hold-up from individual 
farmers obviously increases transaction costs
17. 
 
Bi-lateral monopolies have indeterminate pricing outcomes because they depend upon the relative 
bargaining power of the parties. Each party has incentive to misrepresent its position in order to 
extract a greater share of the gains of  rearrangement in such negotiations, and there is little 
competitive pressure to force more accurate information revelation.  Accordingly, negotiations often 
                                                 
16 Vittel spring can be considered as being located at the bottom of a basin, making it very likely to collect pollution 
regardless of the point in the catchment area from where the pollution discharge has been emitted. 
 
17 Note that this is like comparing the holdup potential that upstream users of river water have on downstream users. In a 
similar way, the value of a downstream water right is conditional on upstream use.   9 
break down and take a long time to complete (Williamson, 1975, 238-47). This was especially the 
case with farmers owning fields essential for the overall effectiveness of the Vittel arrangement.  
 
33. Third-Party Effects 
In the case of Vittel, the situation was somewhat surprising and differing from the cliché because the 
pollutee was a big industria l and the polluters, a group of small farms. On the one hand, there were 
complaints that the Vittel action was disturbing the local agricultural economy. The magnitudes of the 
effects were disputed by Vittel and farmers. Tensions and jealousy between farmers located within 
the critical area and the other ones located outside, and consequently excluded from the negotiations, 
were sometimes very high. The concerns raised in the farming community  –especially on farmers 
unions and other agricultural organizations – about the impact of changes in farming were also 
significant, because the dominant, industrial agriculture model was substituted with a new and more 
stringent production process. The limited number of concerned farmers may have mitigated the 
negative third-party effects, making them quite small. The farmers involved in the Vittel arrangement 
were also over-publicized, making them very reluctant to further solicitations. Notice also that some 
farmers have been reluctant to accept the proposed contracts, e.g. because of union activism. On the 
other hand, because Vittel was a major employer and the water reputation was the determinant of 
many other activities, e.g. tourism, thermalism, the efforts required by Vittel from farmers were 
perceived as legitimate and necessary. For example, according to several participants of the research 
team, because each farmer has a member of his family working to Vittel, they are under pressure to 
find an arrangement to not threat such jobs. Lastly, there was a strong political support to make the 
experience successful and at a certain extent, regardless of the overall costs (Barbier, 2004). 
 
Proposition 2: Valuation disputes (+), bilateral monopoly (+), and third-party effects (+/-) shape 
transaction costs and may derail a Coasean bargaining alternative. 
 
Given the difficulties highlighted above, it is a priori unlikely that a direct negotiation between the 
pollutee and polluters occurs. Nevertheless, Vittel and farmers succeeded to bargain. So, in the 
following we explain in detail how transaction  (and production) costs were  sufficiently low and 
somewhat reduced by innovative devices leading to the success of this contractual arrangement. 
 
 
4. How transaction costs were overcome? 
Although Vittel is a major employer in the small region, it had little knowledge of the farmers’ 
realities and reasoning (Barbier). For example, the regulatory context was perceived differently by 
Vittel and farmers. Indeed, farmers were arguing that potable water requires 50 mg nitrates per liter, 
which was achieved, but mineral water must satisfy a 15 mg per liter threshold. Then, as mentioned in 
the introductory section, Vittel turned its attention to research by contracting with the French National 
Agronomic Institute (INRA). Whilst the desired outcome by Vittel was clear, the ways to achieve it 
needed to be defined. This intervention of researchers and other measures have allowed the reduction 
of transaction costs and deserve a development. 
 
(1) The indirect governmental intervention through the research team has facilitated the development 
of the type of arrangement being described. Indeed, the research team has played a strong role in 
determining the base on which Vittel will negotiate with individual farmers the terms of each 
contract, especially the level of compensation. Vittel do not have competences in agriculture and do 
not know what changes are necessary to reach its nitrate rates objective. Note that farmers were also 
not competent to determine what changes must be achieved. Each party experiences a lack of 
reciprocal knowledge and trust. The research team played a strong role in defining precisely the rights 
which have to be included in the contracts to achieve the desired performance in terms of water 
quality. Moreover, the research team played a role of mediation and mutual comprehension between 
a priori divergent and dissymmetric interests of the two parties, i.e. an important industrial company 
trying to improve its water quality and farmers aware of public concerns but fearing the change of 
their production systems. 
   10 
The competence of the research team and their mediatory role were essential to reach an agreement 
on these technical and economic questions. Moreover, the perception of the research team by farmers 
was better than the perception of Vittel Company, which was perceived as an industrial giant willing 
to end farming in the sensitive area. For instance, there were problems of agreeing on valuation of the 
impact on the farms. For farm property, the prices proposed by Vittel were very attractive and above 
the usual expected price for agricultural lands in the small region. The research team played a strong 
role by gathering raw data about each farm, classify them in homogeneous and representative classes 
and simulate several scenarios corresponding to the ‘loss’ that can be imputed to the required changes 
(INRA). 
 
Notice that during the valuation process, researchers collected information
18 about each farm  —
location, technical data, economic and financial results, farmer project, already done investments, etc. 
Nevertheless, some farmers challenged the researchers estimated values. However, because of status, 
previous relationships and social proximity between farmers and research teams, the research 
intervention – or ‘instrumentalization’ by Vittel according to some people – was likely to play a 
positive counter effect by economizing on transaction costs (Glaeser et al., 2000). More than ‘ready to 
use’ solutions, the research team, with the assistance of the farmers, progressively elaborated 
technical and economically feasible solutions compatible with farmers’ strategies. This collaborative 
process contributed to increase farmers’ acceptance because the clause of the proposed contracts was 
co-built and integrated farmers’ concerns (INRA; Gafsi). 
 
The financial participation of the French Water Agency in the research program was also significant 
(INRA). At the same time, the Vittel area benefited from an OGAF
19, facilitating the reorganization of 
the lands within defined boundaries thanks to a funding by public authorities at a national level. Of 
course, the public authorities played a fundamental role in providing a credible legal system to assure 
the enforceability of contracts and granting some limited financial aid (Perrot-Maître and Davis). The 
implication of the State was important for several reasons. First, the research team was interested in 
having a ‘real laboratory’ to test and apply an interdisciplinary approach. Second, some public actors 
were interested in designing a methodology that can be applied to other areas experiencing similar 
problems (INRA). By participating in the arrangement design, public actors remain key players. Third, 
the quality of Vittel waters has some public properties (employment in Vittel but also in many related 
activities such as thermalism and tourism, region reputation and so on). Lastly, there was a strong 
political willingness to make the project succeed. 
 
Proposition 3: External intervention, notably governmental may lower costs of defining property 
rights because of specific skills and less conflictual relationships with transactors. Nevertheless, 
under some plausible circumstances, this external intervention may unduly ‘subsidy’ the private 
rent resulting from the rearrangement. 
 
Noteworthy, the external intervention and the incurred costs may be considered as an investment 
which is to some extent redeployable. By participating indirectly in the Vittel arrangement, public 
authorities kept some intellectual rights on the approach which has served as a model in several other 
environmental related transactions on water quality in some French cities such as Lons Le Saunier, 
Pontivier and Auxerre. 
 
(2) The subsequent quality of the groundwater was bundled with the land.  Then, early, Vittel bought 
several fields (about 1500 ha), i.e. acquired property and tenant rights close to its springs at attractive 
prices (Chia and Raulet, 1994; Brossier and Gafsi, 1997) and became the owner of 45% of the 
sensitive area shaping the water quality. These lands come mainly from retiring farmers. Vittel seems 
to have benefited from a  ‘special right’ or arrangement with the SAFER (the French P ublic 
Organization in charge of agricultural land transactions) to buy in priority all available lands in the 
                                                 
18 A major part of this information remains confidential. 
 
19 OGAF (Opérations Groupées d’aménagement Foncier) is the French acronym for grouped operations for land planning.   11 
defined area. This very particular arrangement, somewhat obscure, cannot be applied to all the lands 
because of the existing laws that restrain transactions on agricultural lands. At this time, the pressures 
from other stakeholders remain relatively limited. Nevertheless, these purchases were not enough to 
improve the water quality. Indeed, the impacts subsequent to the partial integration of some fields are 
ineffective unless the majority of concerned farmers become participants (Schmidtz, 1991)
20. 
Moreover, an attempt to buy all lands would lead Vittel to a ‘jacquerie’ (Barbier, 2004). 
 
The purchase of some lands and their use in the bargaining process was very powerful to convince 
some more reluctant farmers. For some farmers, the lands previously purchased by Vittel and 
supplied after at very attractive conditions have enabled them to considerably increase the size of 
their farms. The main obligations under the individual private contracts are very easy to monitor and 
enforce, making the enforcement costs of the arrangement relatively low (Chia, 2004). Finally, 
several farmers of the Vittel perimeter switched to organic production, allowing a premium of their 
agricultural products (Reibel, 1999). 
 
(3) To ensure its obligations and prove its sustainable implication in the radical change, Vittel has 
created an agricultural advisory firm, Agrivair. The mission of this firm is to advise, accompany, 
monitor and enforce contracts with farmers (Gafsi).  Agrivair has recently introduced new 
technologies such as information geographic system to manage sewage spreads, which can increase 
the quality of its services. Several clauses of the contracts relate to the prevention of fraud, such as 
free access to accounting documents and visual inspection of farms. According to Chia (2004), 
‘visual inspection is sufficient and very easy for anyone well experimented in agriculture.’ Notice 
also that Agrivair achieves itself (in other words ‘has integrated’) some tasks, e.g. composting that 
ensure the result and make monitoring operations less costly
21. An interesting feature of the 
enforcement is the use of scientific research procedures that have been adapted for other purposes 
than their initial use (Chia and Raulet). During the process of applied research, an extension specialist 
was recruited to ensure constant communication between farmers, Vittel and the research team 
(Gafsi). It should be noted that the person in charge of Agrivair was the same agricultural extension 
specialist who worked previously for the research team (Deffontaines and Brossier; Chia and Raulet). 
 
Proposition 4: Property rights will be defined to the extent that the costs of doing so equal the 
benefits of doing so. Rather than integrating the whole asset, more precise property rights may 
allow a transaction-cost-economizing by rearranging only the ‘optimal’ subset of property rights. 
 
 
5. The contractual arrangement between Vittel and farmers 
The organizational arrangement is a private contractual one. The contracts allow (1) the definition of 
property rights on production choice and agricultural practices, and, (2) the transfer of property rights 
from the formal owners or users of the fields, i.e. the farmers to the industrial company, Vittel. The 
research team helped to define the specifications and clauses of the contracts and the obligations of 
each party. To contract with targeted farmers, Vittel negotiated with each of them and proposed 
individual incentives and compensations. The incentives provided by Vittel to encourage farmers’ 
acceptance were variable among farmers according to their individual situations. For example, the 
percentage of lands in the catchment area was a strategic variable in the bargaining phase. Farmers 
agreed to switch to less intensive dairy farming and pasture management. The property rights transfer 
lasts for a limited period
22 and farmers are rewarded by several ways such as income support, 
                                                 
20 The improvement of water quality requires that Vittel have the environmental rights over the most part of the concerned 
lands. If the quantity of purchased lands plus the quantity of lands under contract are insufficient, the water quality will not 
be noticeably improved and Vittel may consider that he squandered his resources. 
 
21 It should be noticed that conflictual relations occurred at times between Agrivair and farmers (Reibel). 
 
22 The duration of contracts is 18 or 30 years. 
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compensation for abandoning a farm project adopting a new trajectory, equipment subsidies, and free 
technical assistance. The main (and average) obligations of the farmers and Vittel are described in 
Table 2. Note that the specifications required by Vittel were on several points more stringent than 
organic farming requirements. 
 
Table 2. Main obligations of farmers and Vittel. 
Farmers  Vittel 
Eliminate corn crop 
Ban pesticides 
Compost all animal waste 
Nitrogen fertilization by composted manure (an 
additional nitrogen contribution less than 30 
units per ha is tolerated) 
Limit one livestock unit per ha of grazing area 
and balance livestock feed 
Ensure farm buildings are up to Agrivair 
standards, exceeding legal obligations 
€ 230 per ha and per year during 7 years 
Equipment investment of about 150 000 euros per farm 
(haymaking materials, barn drying, buildings, etc.) 
Free supplying of manure treatments and use 
(composting, spreading, etc.) 
Free technical assistance  
Free usufruct of the previously bought fields and the 
quotas associated (about 25% more) 
Notes: 
1. Farmers have substituted corn by Lucerne and lost the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) aid attributed to this crop. 
2. The services supplied by Agrivair represent 23% of the overall seasonal works for each farm (Gafsi). 
Main Sources: Gafsi. 
 
The payment is not indexed on the improvement of water quality, but based on the switching costs 
and compensations resulting from the adoption of a less intensive farming system. First, there are 
significant measurement difficulties. Indeed, ‘nitrates and pesticides take several years to reach the 
groundwater’ (French Environment Ministry quoted by LSA). To assess the impact of the changes in 
practices on the nitrates rate, an important delay is necessary. Moreover, it is frequently difficult to 
impute the individual responsibility to the nitrate rate decrease and consequently to pay farmers 
according to this measure. Many other natural factors (rain, soil and so on) can hedge the degree of 
pollution (LSA). As mentioned before, reducing or maintaining a low nitrate rate was not really a 
gain for Vittel, but rather, avoiding a huge loss. Indeed, several water bottlers have been forced to 
close their business or delocate their operations because of pollution, e.g. Katell-Roc, Divona, Bagatz 
and Langoat
23. Second, farmers who own the rights of using their lands as they want will not engage 
in any bargaining if they do not have the guarantee that their adjustment costs (their revenue loss) will 
be clearly taken into account. Adjustment costs seem to constitute a kind of ‘best available proxy’ to 
economize on measurement and bargaining costs. 
 
From the Vittel point of view, this arrangement can be considered as more cost-effective and 
sustainable than a permanent compensation. The expected effect is to ‘lock’ farmers in the required 
changes, making a flashback to previous polluting practices, unlikely to occur. A sample of surveyed 
farms shows they have increased their average usable agricultural surface by 34% (Gafsi).  
 
Although the change in cultural systems has affected 11 % only of the whole farming area until 1994 
(INRA, 1996) and despite the initial reluctance of some farmers, the number of farmers under 
contract has grown and reached a rate of 92% of targeted farmers (Barbier, 1997; Gafsi) and 96 % of 
the targeted lands are today under contracts. Note that the number of contracting farmers is evolving 
over time because of retirement, succession, operations on lands and so forth.  
 
Between the initial question raised to the INRA team in June 1987 and the signature of the first 
individual contracts with farmers at the end of 1992, the period lasts about 4-5 years (INRA). The 
main quoted reason to explain the non-commitment of some farmers (3/36) is (1) their strong political 
commitment, notably in farmers unions, to champion their vision of a modern agriculture, (2) the 
                                                 
23 Drévillon, Y., 2000, Les Bretons assoiffés d'eau  en bouteille, Le télégramme, 16/02/2000,  http://www.bretagne-
online.tm.fr/telegram/htdocs/archive/2000/20000216/une/hm_article/eau.htm. 
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financial situation of some reluctant farmers (very high sunk costs invested in intensive farming and 
high debt ratio) making the obligations of the contract unachievable and (3) the issues related to land 
tenure and succession
24. According to INRA (1996), the farmers’ decisions were clearly influenced 
by the perceived extent of practices changes, the offer of Vittel and its ability to address their specific 
concerns (size increase, financial compensations, succession problems, issues related to land tenure, 
overall sustainability), farmer’s situation and the fit of the proposed change with each farmer’s goals. 
Moreover, note that some farmers have left the area since the first negotiations, reducing the total 
number of target farmers from 40 to 36. In addition, there are differences in agricultural processes 
among farmers. For example, there are three kinds of breeding and thus, farmers’ expectations 
regarding Vittel recommendations were different (INRA, 1996). 
 
 
6. Assessment of the arrangement 
In terms of performances, the records show that the overall nitrates rate in groundwater has decreased. 
Fifty per cent of monitored springs experienced a decrease of the nitrates rate and the other 50% have 
a constant nitrates rate (Gafsi). 
 
Vittel has incurred different costs in getting the mechanism to work. We distinguish three kinds of 
costs: (1) the design costs including the contract with the INRA and other costs for defining the 
accurate area to buy or put under contract, the property rights to contract, the terms of contracts with 
farmers, (2) implementation costs notably including buying fields and investments in individual farms 
under contract, the costs associated with creating and running Agrivair, and economic compensations 
negotiated with farmers for changes in farming methods, and, (3) enforcement costs i.e. the costs of 
accompanying and monitoring farmers. Vittel spent more than € 24,000,000
25 for 3500 ha over seven 
years and successfully converted the farming practices of most concerned farmers (INRA, 1997, p. 
69). More data on the costs incurred by Vittel are provided in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Costs incurred by Vittel for the contractual arrangement. 
Land acquisition  € 9.14   millions 
Investments in farm equipment  € 3.81   millions 
Other expenditures, mainly financial compensations  € 11.3   millions 
Total costs for Vittel  € 24.25  millions 
Cost of protecting the resource per m
3 of bottled water  € 1.52 
(Source: http://www.observatoire-environnement.org/OBSERVATOIRE, 2005) 
 
Compared to the potential loss, the overall cost of the contractual arrangement incurred by Vittel 
(around  € 24 millions) seem a very profitable investment. Moreover, the Vittel rent was partly 
financed by public funds including the research team, the Agence de l’Eau support and the grouped 
operations for land planning (OGAF) funds.  
 
While the contracting may seem very costly, the evidence  suggests that the arrangement was 
profitable for both parties and likely to be applied elsewhere. The approach has been applied to other 
companies of Nestlé Waters, i.e. Contrexeville and Perrier. The application of the same approach to 
the Contrexeville springs was more directly related because of its geographic proximity. ‘The Perrier 
springs are located in southern France in an area of vineyards and intensive wheat cultivation where 
                                                 
24 Again, the institutional framework may restrain the extent of the rearrangement. For instance, at the end of the farm 
tenancy period (or when the farmer retires), the land owner (the successor) may recover the lands and decide to use them as 
he wants. Moreover, each farmer leases from several owners. Vittel has to take into account such issues in contract duration 
or by proposing innovative contracts in the French legal context that can be enforced over time regardless of the land owner 
or user. 
 
25 This corresponds to an average of € 980 per ha and per year, including initial investments. Note that in comparison with 
subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), € 300 per ha and per year, the contractual arrangement was very 
attractive for farmers. 
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phosphates and herbicides are the main sources of water pollution. Perrier successfully introduced 
organic agriculture to 20 farms that cultivate approximately 350 hectares of cereals and 200 ha of 
vineyards and regularly monitors over 900 ha of land. The highly favorable market conditions for 
organic products made significant contributions to the rapid adoption of improved farming practices 
around the Perrier springs. Other French bottlers — Evian and Volvic — have considered using 
Vittel’s experience as a model’ (Perrot-Maître and Davis). The tools and approach developed by the 
research team have also been applied to other cases of water contamination by farming practices, 
e.g. in the Migennois and Plateau Lorrain (INRA)
26. 
 
Proposition 5: If the contractual arrangement is redeployable to some extent, the initial transaction 
costs can be considered as spread over all the expected applications.  
 
Nevertheless, a potential obstacle to the transposition of such a model relates to the technical and 
financial dependence of farms with regard to the other party involved in the contract (Brossier and 
Gafsi). Several other issues can affect the potential for transferability (Perrot-Maître and Davis): 
 
Scale: The Vittel model may be difficult to use in larger geographic areas or in an area with a greater 
number of farmers. As noted elsewhere (Libecap; Ostrom, 1990), the greater the number of parties is, 
the higher the transaction costs associated with designing, implementing and enforcing an agreement 
are. If the transaction costs overcome a certain level, they can make other alternatives m ore cost-
effective. 
 
Timing: If quality drinking water was needed immediately, the approach adopted by Vittel may be 
too slow to achieve such a performance, making filtration plants unavoidable with the risk of losing 
the mineral water label. The timing includes the time needed to design solutions, solve valuation 
disputes and the lag between adoption and performances change. For example, between February 
1993 and February 1996, the proportion of farmers under contract evolved from 3% to 65% and to 
92% in 1998 (Barbier; Gafsi). Such a dimension stresses the need to consider pollution problems at 
early stages rather than when pollution thresholds are exceeded or in other words ‘damage is done’.  
 
Private sector profitability: Given the high level of investment required, imitating the Vittel 
approach seems limited to highly profitable industries (Gafsi). The purchase of property rights (land 
acquisition, practices changes) was possible because the value of the water quality was significantly 
higher for the bottler than the loss incurred by farmers. The opportunity cost of farmers to accept the 
contract was lower than the opportunity cost of the bottler. The creation of Agrivair was essential 
because it was perceived by farmers as a signal that Vittel was really investing for agriculture and that 
farming changes would really benefit from a long term support (Barbier). Despite the significant cost 
of the Vittel approach, it can be considered as a reasonable alternative by taking into account the 
unlikelihood of the other alternatives discussed in section 3. In addition, the switch of several farmers 
to organic production may have contributed to making the new system more sustainable and 
profitable. 
 
Strong involvement of public research teams: The multidisciplinary research and extension team 
played an essential role in the success of the operation. ‘The research program was finalized in 1996. 
Seven years of research enabled a preliminary conclusion to be drawn regarding three main aspects. 
Firstly, the objective regarding sustainable development on the Vittel plateau was achieved. The 
agrarian system used on the Vittel site has clearly made progress in terms of reducing nitrates levels 
in the water sources and in terms of farmers’ incomes. Secondly, knowledge has been produced over 
a wider spectrum, such as in technical and socio-economic fields. The apparent high cost of the 
operation does not make this experience prohibitive. And, when drinking water becomes scarce, 
financial backing could easily be found. The third aspect concerns the positioning of the research 
                                                 
26 A similar example can be found in the contractual arrangement between the city of Munich (Germany) and farmers in the 
Mangfall valley to maintain the city’s high drinking water standards. Farmers have been encouraged to adopt organic 
agriculture and received, as an incentive, about € 281,21 per hectare and per year, and technical assistance (Heid, 1997).   15 
team faced with a complex question: the research team – placed in a highly uncertain context having 
accepted the challenge of a complex question – formulated, set up and implemented a wide range of 
technical and social tools which brought the various actors together on several levels. This is a good 
example of negotiated management’ (Brossier and Gafsi, 2000). 
 
Table 4 provides some key elements that allow comparisons between Vittel and three other cases of 
successful (Munich  or Auxerre programs) and unsuccessful (Katell-Roc) negotiations with farmers 
for environmental property rights. 
 
Table 4. Some comparisons between Vittel and other cases of contracting with farmers to preserve water quality. 
Case  Vittel  Auxerre  Katell-Roc  Munich 
Place  Vosges  Plaine du Saulce  Lizio (Brittany)  Mangfall valley 
Perimeter size  4360 ha (of which 3500 
ha are farmed)  
9000 ha    6000 ha (of which 2250 are 
farmed) 
Externality  Water pollution by 
nitrates 
Water pollution by nitrates  Water pollution by nitrates  Water pollution by nitrates 
and pesticides 
Who  Farmers  Farmers  Farmers  Farmers  Polluters 
Number  40  40  Unknown  ? 
Who  Mineral water bottler  Association de la Plaine de 
la Saulce 
Katell-Roc bottler  SWM (Munich water 
company) 
Number  1  1 (60 000 inhabitants)  1  1 (1 400 000 inhabitants)  Pollutees 
Status  Private actor  Non lucrative private actor  Private actor   Private then public since 
1998 












-  Organic farming 
(++) 
Contracting farmers  37  24   -  107 (2004) 
Surface under contract  About 3350 ha  ?  -  2650 ha 
Compensation  € 230 /ha/year  during 7 
years 
Initial equipment 
€ 69 /ha/year  -  € 281,21 /ha/year during 6 
years coupled with € 152 
/ha/year during 5 years 
(AES) 
€ 230,08 /ha/year during 12 
years 
Whole costs incurred by 
the pollutees 
About € 24 M€  About € 1,9 M€  Closing the unit  About 14.5 M€ 
Opportunity cost 
estimation compared to 
production and 
transaction costs 
>  >  <  > 
Measurement difficulty   Very high (+++)  High (++)  High (++)  High (++) 
Third parties  Farmers’ unions, Vittel 
employees, tourism 
Citizens  Employees, local social and 
economic life 




INRA, Water agency 






DDASS  The city of Munich (bought 
bioproducts for its 
institutions (schools) to 
enhance demand and 
finances farmers for AES). 
 
In the Vittel case, the opportunity cost of Vittel doing nothing was huge, especially compared with 
the opportunity cost of farmers changing practices. Such a situation makes the rearrangement very 
likely. The switching costs to move to more environmentally friendly farming practices were not well 
estimated. Consequently, Vittel had to give up a part of the informational rent, growing the gains of 
the farmers. Farmers may tend to adopt an opportunistic behavior, increasing the monitoring costs of 
Vittel. The strategy adopted by Vittel seems able to generate a kind of self ‘lock-in’ of farmers to the 
environmentally friendly changes. Rather than permanent funding for the quasi-integration of the 
relevant subset of rights, Vittel causes the changes and finances them, but once these changes are   16 
achieved, they are supposed to be self-enforcing
27. Indeed, farmers are supposed to acquire specific 
knowledge and  abilities about environmentally friendly farming and price premiums for 
environmentally differentiated products, such as organic products. Once this is done, it is expected 
that the opportunity costs –including notably switching costs – will be sufficiently high, making the 
return to the traditional polluting process not profitable.  
 
Proposition  6: The higher the expected gain from rearranging property rights, the higher the 
likelihood of a successful rearrangement of property rights. 
 
In addition, Table 5  summarizes the main characteristics of this institutional arrangement in a 
comparative approach, i.e. in comparison with  the t hree other similar arrangements. Noteworthy, 
voluntary contractual arrangements can be effective devices to deal with non-point-source pollution 
in comparison with more traditional command-and-control or market-based instruments.  Another 
interesting point from this comparison is the fact the repartition of transaction costs (design, 
implementation, and enforcement) varies among these similar contractual arrangements. For instance, 
Vittel has incurred important ex ante transaction costs to design draft a specific contract while the 
Munich program has used a standardized contract, i.e. organic farming. Ex post enforcement costs are 
reduced in the Vittel case because most contractual clauses can be visually monitored by Agrivair 
employees while Munich program relies mainly on conventional inspections for organic farming that 
are achieved by third party certifiers paid by the Munich program
28. 
 
                                                 
27 While moral hazard may constitute a real issue in temporary rearrangement of environmental rights, it may be mitigated to 
some extent by the need for producers to make significant initial investments in knowledge, skills, materials, and time to 
become operational. Indeed, acquiring and assimilating environmental abilities implies initial sunk costs and can be 
considered as a choice made once and for all (see Rogerson, 1983 for a similar rationale). Once acquired these abilities may 
generate a kind of “self lock-in” reinforced by the threat of losing price premiums. 
 
28 There can be a degree of substituability between the different categories of transaction costs that arise at different times of 
the transaction. Indeed, Williamson (1985) emphasizes the distinction between ex ante and ex post transaction costs whereas 
Dahlman  (1979)  distinguishes different types of transaction costs according to the stage of the transaction. This 
substituability is analogous to the substituability between inputs in production functions. Measuring the degree of 
substitutability between any pair of categories of transaction costs can be done similarly to the estimation of the elasticity of 
substitution. More formally, the elasticity of substitution measures the percentage change in transaction costs proportions 
due to a change in marginal rate of ‘technical’ substitution. Substitution effects can allow minimizing overall transaction 
costs in order to achieve a specific transaction. Because of asymmetric information and unequal allocation of power, some 
parties may have a vested interest in making other parties support their transaction costs, exploiting the substituability 
described above, in order to minimize their own transaction costs, regardless of whether or not this results in overall 
minimization of overall transaction costs. Such ‘substitution effects’ between categories of transactions have to be taken into 
account in order to minimize the overall transaction costs. 
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Table 5: Characteristics of arrangements that deal with water pollution problems 
Case  Vittel  Auxerre  Katell-Roc  Munich 
Buy  X 
 
 
    X 
Contract  X 
 
 
X    X 
Type of 
arrangement 
Leave      X 
“There was no means of 
diminishing nitrates rate 
at a reasonable  cost 
“(CEO)” 
 
Collective/individual  I  C  -  I 
Contract duration  18 years and 30 years  5 years  -  18 years 




Use of the public funded 
research team 
 
Not very costly because 
of generic requirements 
 
Use of the 
environmentalist 
association 
“We have not the Perrier 
financial willingness, 
thus it is deadly for a 
firm like our” (CEO) 
Selecting a unique 
alternative: organic 
conversion. “A part from 
the ecological farming 
model no other 
improvement measures 
are at hand which would 
lead to lower 
administrative costs” 
(Schuchardt, 2004) 
Implementation  Adversarial relations 













Enforcement  Partially self-enforcing 
(organic farming) and 
Agrivair enforcement 
(++) 
2 agents were hired to 
control the application of 
the required measures 
-  Relies on conventional 
enforcement of organic 
farming 
Overall assessment  Significant decrease in 
the nitrate rate (see in 
full text) 
 
Cost for Vittel: 1,52€/m
3 
Not yet evaluated  Closing the source  Nitrate rate down from 
14 µg/litre to 8-10 µg/l  
 
Cost for Munich: 0,001 
€/m
3 while dropping 




In conclusion, this  rearrangement of rights, based on individual contracts, constitutes a  private 
solution for externality problems where clear property rights and easy identification of stakeholders 
played a key role. The applied principle was not ‘the polluter pays’, but the counterintuitive ‘pollutee 
pays’. This arrangement constitutes an original application of Coase’s recommendations in a real 
world context with high transaction costs. The high transaction costs threatening to derail a Coasean 
bargain were overcome, notably by indirect public intervention, through research team and other 
informal arrangement; the main roles devoted to the public authorities in a Coasean solution including 
notably the definition and enforcement of property rights were evident in the Vittel success (Van 
Zandt, 1993). Several lessons can be drawn from this case study that can be useful, especially for 
other applications by carefully taking into account other institutional environments. 
 
 
7. Policy considerations  
The Vittel case study points several challenging issues for researchers and policymakers. Without 
purporting to be exhaustive, let us consider some of them.  
 
First, it seems obvious that a clear definition and non-contestable allocation of property rights may 
economize on transaction costs.  In the Vittel case, the intervention of public authorities,  notably 
through research teams, to delineate property rights played a strong role in the success of the private 
arrangement. The accurate identification of a subset of sufficient property rights tied with land 
property – i.e. farming practices over a well-defined area – allowed agents to engage in a coasean   18 
bargaining process.  Research teams also contributed to the identification of key technological 
variables that play a role in the level of water nitrate rate and proxies used to monitor them (Barzel, 
1982)
29. Let us stress again the strong uncertainties faced by Vittel about the technical path that the 
farmers ought to follow in order to reduce their harmful effects. Indeed, the causalities between the 
modification of farming practices and the results in terms of nitrate rate reduction were not well 
established before the intervention of the research teams. Indeed, the relation between the two 
variables is complex and non-linear and results are observable at middle or long-term horizons. 
 
Therefore, in the case of externalities, a major role of the state is to provide the basis –i.e. defining 
and assigning property rights – for a bargaining solution. This investment including learning costs, 
skills, savoir-faire,  can be very costly and prevent private stakeholders from bargaining. If this 
investment can be redeployed to other situations, the initial costs appear as less dissuasive and likely 
to generate economies of scale. In general, public authorities or multinationals because of their 
operations scale are more likely to benefit from such economies of scale. The more the arrangement is 
likely to be applied elsewhere, the more the initial high costs are likely to be overcome. 
Consequently, the intervention costs have to be considered by taking into account the potential 
redeployability of the outcomes. Closely related to this, in order to ensure the redeployability, 
intellectual property rights on the arrangement have to be carefully managed.  
 
Second, the status of the intervening  party, e.g. public research teams, may play a strong role in 
generating trust and consequently reducing transaction costs of reaching an agreement (Glaeser et al.). 
While technical skills may constitute a core ‘input’ to find ‘technical solutions’ to the problem, the 
status of the chosen intermediate party has to be carefully considered, if this is to decrease transaction 
costs. At first glance, we may consider that minimal technical abilities are necessary, but  not 
sufficient. Technical abilities are likely to generate technical trust, trust in the competences, but not 
ethical trust, in the sense that implied parties trust the ethical values of the facilitator.  
 
Third, the co-construction of the contractual arrangement is likely to reduce barriers and to induce a 
greater formal acceptability. In the Vittel case, several points of the contractual arrangement were 
designed in close collaboration with farmers (Deffontaines and Brossier). Unlike ‘external or imposed 
institutions’ where rules are defined independently of agents and  where they have only a ‘binary 
choice’ to follow them or not, the co-construction  increases the overall effectiveness by mitigating 
several  potential barriers.  Agents are not ‘rules takers’ but ‘rules makers’ and their early and 
voluntary participation would increase formal acceptance. Such a co-construction shares several 
similar features with ‘internal or induced institutions’ and their articulation with legal rules or 
regulator power (Dulbecco, 2003). 
 
Fourth, the in-depth study of the Vittel case suggests that the Williamson’s analysis of governance 
structures could be usefully applied to environmental -related transactions
30. Although such an issue is 
out of the scope of this paper, we may consider several promising points. Formally, a subset of the 
property rights  shaping the nitrates rate in groundwater belongs to the French public authorities. 
These property rights are defined and delineated by the regulatory threshold (‘command and control’ 
performance standards) on nitrate rate. The governance structure has a quasi-hierarchical form 
(Richards, 2000) but the enforcement appears very difficult  and costly mainly  because of 
measurement problems.  In order to  secure the nitrate rate at a level  stricter than the regulatory 
threshold,  an additional  governance structure i s necessary. As suggested by neo-institutionalists 
(Coase; Demsetz, 1969; Williamson, 1996) agents implied in the environmental -related transaction 
                                                 
29 Note that efficient measurement would be undertaken by the party who has easy access to information and lower costs of 
measurement, provided that incentives to cheat are curbed and trust is established. ‘The survival hypothesis also suggests 
that, other things being equal, quality must be measured at points in the process of production, exchange and consumption 
where it can be done with the least expenditure of resources’ (Eggertsson, 1999, p. 201). 
 
30 The problem faced by Vittel shares several features with the paradigmatic question of transaction cost economics ‘make or 
buy’ in industrial organization.   19 
have explored and attempted several alternatives before selecting the contractual arrangement that 
appeared as the most efficient at the decision time. Because the property rights shaping the water 
quality were tied to the land, Vittel established long term contracts with farmers to ‘quasi-integrate’ 
such rights, to exercise a kind of hierarchical discretion on the use of these rights. Indeed, Vittel was 
the one who valued these rights the most, compared to the farmers who held the second  highest 
values, making the bargaining solution potentially  profitable for the both transacting parties. The 
Vittel situation, presents a high degree of asset specificity and bilateral dependency notably because 
of reputation and the label ‘natural mineral water’, both being tied to the location. Such bilateral 
dependency makes each party very vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the other transacting 
party.  
 
The identification of the relevant subset of property rights on which to contract shows that precise 
definition of rights can avoid too much integration in favor of a more efficient solution where only 
some property rights (as indicated in the contracts between Vittel and farmers) are transacted. 
Moreover, other barriers were preventing a full integration of all lands around the Vittel springs. Note 
that Vittel attempted a full integration but faced strong opposition of several targeted farmers who 
were very tied to their lands and jobs. Nevertheless, a significant fraction of sensitive lands were 
purchased by Vittel and re-used to get a higher level of adhesion from resistant farmers. So, the 
definition of rights on which to contract was a socially more acceptable solution rather than a whole 
land acquisition (INRA). Thus, high specific assets do not automatically lead to full integration of the 
other transacting party, but may be mediated through long term contracts that allow the quasi-
integration of the relevant subset of rights. 
 
The Vittel strategy to minimize organization costs –costs of setting up and running the hybrid 
organization – needs to be explained. A large part of the cost was indirectly incurred by the public 
authorities through the research teams and the so-called ‘Agence de l’Eau Rhin Meuse’. Vittel has 
benefited from the pre-existing  non-adversarial and non-lucrative relationship of researchers with 
farmers and has consequently economized on a kind of ‘learning costs’. Moreover, as mentioned 
before, an extension specialist was employed by the research team to manage the relations between 
farmers and the research teams. This specialist has acquired very specific competencies, such as 
precise knowledge of local farms and proxies used by the research teams and so on. These core 
competencies were redeployed at relatively low cost to the Agrivair structure. Interestingly, this 
person became the director of Agrivair at the end of his collaboration with the research teams. 
Agrivair may be considered as a micro-institution that improves the enforceability and enforcement of 
arrangements (Ménard 2003, Ménard and Shirley, 2002). Such micro-institutions may explain why 
similar arrangements in similar institutional contexts perform differently.  
 
Fifth, the financial compensation paid by Vittel and the other expenditures implied in this contractual 
arrangement may be used to estimate the value of an environmental (and health-related) good, e.g. the 
decrease of the quantity of nitrates per liter. The case study may provide raw data to apply the 
averting behavior methods. The rationale of such a method is that the cost a pollutee, incurred in 
order to avert the negative effects of polluted water, can be considered as  an indicator of the 
pollutee’s willingness to pay for the improvement of water quality. Such method is likely to provide 





The in depth case study of the environment-related transaction between Vittel and farmers provides 
raw materials for confronting theoretical propositions and arguments with a real world situation. 
Several policy implications and theoretical insights have been drawn from the Vittel case, showing 
that the ‘problem is one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with harmful 
effects (…). Satisfactory views on policies can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the 
market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects’ (Coase). The confrontation has 
put into relief several exciting and challenging issues. Indeed, the Vittel case shows that even in the   20 
presence of  a priori  high transaction costs, a Coasean bargaining solution may be d esigned and 
implemented successfully if these transaction costs are sufficiently low. 
 
The degree of subdivision of rights can improve the efficiency of transactions, because agents can 
contract on the necessary rights only. Consequently, they make the Coasean bargaining process more 
efficient. However, such precise delineation and definition is not costless and must be considered in 
context with the expected benefits, over a comprehensive horizon, including the possibility of other 
similar applications. The role played by public authorities was also decisive and obviously reduced 
the overall transaction costs, as well as reducing the transaction costs incurred by each party. The 
success and the transposition of the approach in other places must not hide the risk that public 
authorities may be ‘instrumentalized’ by private parties. 
 
One of the most promising issues resides in the possible extension of the Williamson’s framework to 
environmental economics;  in t he dimensionalization of environmental -related transactions and 
governance structures and  in  their alignment, especially in the policy instruments chosen for 
supporting environmental-related transactions. The contractual arrangement with an ad hoc structure 
–between a pollutee and several polluters generating non-point source pollution – provides an original 
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